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Abstract. The paper will address the role (or lack thereof) of military 
history and past experience in military doctrine building. The analysis 
will be based on four case studies: the Reichswehr/Wehrmacht 1919–
1940, the French army 1919–1940, the IDF 1948–1973, and the US 
Army 1973–1991. In the synthesis, the author will present the role of 
military history in building efficient military doctrine on three levels of 
war: tactics, operational art, and strategy. Several kinds of abuses and 
misuses of military history will be singled out as a warning sign for con-
temporary policy and military decision makers.
No war game, exercise or training enables a soldier to practise war. There 
is no laboratory in which war could be researched or tested. The only 
guide we have is history. Unfortunately, it offers no clear answers, may be 
misused and cannot foresee the future. Armies also use their experience 
of current or already finished conflicts to mould their military doctrines. 
If correctly applied, militaries may benefit enormously from both types 
of experience.
The past is not history; what is more, we cannot be sure that we know 
everything about historical events. Quite the opposite. A good example is 
the impact of Terence Zuber’s research on Schlieffen’s plan,1 which shook 
well-founded beliefs about German war planning before WWI. For the 
1 Terence Zuber, Inventing the Schlieffen plan: German war planning, 1871–1914 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002); Terence Zuber, The Real German War Plan, 1904–14 (Stroud: 
History Press, 2011).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.22601/SAA.2019.08.04
115Building Military Doctrine based on History and Experience
purposes of this article, it does not matter whether Zuber was right or 
not, but that historical events may be reinterpreted, sometimes radi-
cally. Additionally, the military history of mankind is so rich that one can 
almost always find an example to support one’s views in an argument. As 
Michael Howard wrote, history is an “inexhaustible storehouse of events” 
that can be used “to prove anything or its contrary.”2
There is also the matter of interpretation. The same events could 
be seen in radically different light by historians. in his letter to Liddell-
Hart, Field Marshal Archibald Wavell wrote: “With your knowledge and 
brains and command of the pen, you could have written just as con-
vincing a book called the ‘Strategy of the Direct Approach’.”3 This was 
praise for the writing and intellectual skills of Liddell-Hart, but it clearly 
shows what an experienced soldier thought about the interpretation of 
military history. 
If that is not enough, Clausewitz informs us that: “Instead of present-
ing a fully detailed case, critics are content merely to touch on three or 
four, which give semblance of strong proof. But there are occasions where 
nothing can be proved by a dozen examples (…) Obviously, this is no way 
to reach conclusion.”4
There is also a matter of truth. Napoleon stated: “It is so hard to reach 
the truth. There are so many of them!” A similar conclusion was reached 
by General Max Hoffmann after WWI: “For the first time in my life I have 
seen ‘History’ at close quarters, and I know that its actual process is very 
different from what is presented to posterity.”5
It seems, therefore, that simply quoting historical examples is not a 
way to prove anything, especially if it is taken out of a historical con-
text, which is always unique. This very common error causes history to 
be abused in order to prove a predetermined conclusion, the correctness 
of the doctrine or the truth of the theory. On the other hand, as Goethe 
2 Michael Howard, “The Lessons of History: An Inaugural Lecture given in the University of 
Oxford, March 1981,” – The Lessons of History, ed. Michael Howard (New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1991), 11.
3 Jay Luvaas, “Military History: is it still practicable?”, Parameters 25 (Summer 1995): 85–86.
4 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 172.
5 Luvaas, “Military History,” 89.
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wrote in one of his poems, one that is not using humankind’s experience 
of 3000 years lives life only day to day.6
The real questions are: What do armies think about military history? 
How do they use it? What about real wartime experience? How quickly 
does this experience evaporate due to technological/doctrinal change? 
Are the generals always preparing for the last war? 
Case study selection
In this article, four case studies from the period of the last 100 years are 
presented. All of them show armies preparing for high-intensity war. The 
top military establishments of all these armies were professional, patri-
otic, experienced and fully aware that the existence of their states was in 
their hands. Different approaches to military history and battlefield expe-
rience returned different results, although in none of the cases was there 
one and only reason for victory or defeat. 
The first two focus on French and German military doctrines cre-
ated in the interwar period (1919–1939). In both cases, military history 
was used as an educational tool but in different ways. The Reichsheer, 
and later the Wehrmacht, focused on tactical-operational efficiency and 
quality of the commanders, while the French army decided that strategic 
level preparations for a long, total war were much more important. Those 
two approaches show how military history and battlefield experience may 
impact militaries’ short- and long-term ability to win wars.
The third case describes the military doctrine of the Israeli Defense 
Forces (IDF) during the Yom Kippur War. The doctrine was founded on 
battlefield experience of Israeli officers with military history having almost 
no influence at all. While the IDF succeeded in winning the war militar-
ily, it came at a high cost and ended in a political stalemate at best. Israelis 
won due to tactical proficiency, talent for improvisation and very high 
6 Johann Wolfgang v.  Goethe, West-Oestliche Divan, sektion 5 (Buch des Unmuts): Wer nicht 
von dreitausend Jahren / Sich weiß Rechenschaft zu geben, / Bleib im Dunkeln unerfahren, / Mag 
von Tag zu Tage leben.
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morale, which was not combined with understanding of operational and 
strategic dimensions of war that only study of military history can yield. 
The fourth case is the US Army in the period of 1973–1991 and evo-
lution of its doctrine from Active Defence to Air-Land Battle. This was a 
shift from a mechanistic view on warfare to a more balanced view – one 
that combined introduction of operational level of war, study of military 
history, new technology and serious tactical training. Such an evolution 
shows complex interactions between these factors and their impact on 
battlefield efficiency and ability to win wars. 
German army military doctrine building after WWI
Just after the Great War ended, the Reichsheer started to prepare for the 
“second round”. In 1919 general Hans von Seeckt formed fifty-seven com-
mittees and subcommittees dealing with a multitude of topics – from 
weather service and flamethrowers to air war, in which more than 500 
officers (130 from air arm) worked to extract experience from the war.7 
What is important is that those committees were set up just after the war 
while the experience of war was still fresh. Additionally, the high par-
ticipation rate among officers ensured the best possible result. After two 
years of research, in 1921, a new field regulation was published under the 
title of Leadership and Combat with Combined Arms.8 There is a direct 
link between the work of Seeckt’s committees and what was published 
in the tactical regulation. Although the proverb says that generals always 
study the last war, the truth is that they rarely do so. It is historically very 
rare for an army to delve deep into its experience of the last war. This is 
more probable on the losing side, but one seldom finds examples of such 
scrutiny as was Seeckt’s. 
With its 100,000 troops, including 4,000 officers, the Reichsheer was 
fortunate in many ways. Due to long-term service of its soldiers, it could 
7 James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg. Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Law-
rence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 37.
8 Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen (F. u. G.) vom 1. September 1921, D. V. Pl. Nr. 
487 (Berlin: Verl. Offene Worte, 1921).
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become genuinely professional and was able to practice and experiment on 
an unprecedented scale. The army did not have to deal with the mountains 
of rapidly aging weapons. In the late 1920s, when the process of (secret) 
remilitarization started, the Reichsheer, and later on the Wehrmacht, were 
able to receive well thought out and modern weapons thanks to the high-
quality industrial base. What is more, that equipment was well adjusted 
to rehearsed doctrine. Thanks to the above, for some fifteen years Ger-
many did not have to spend huge amounts of money on its armed forces, 
although spending per soldier was among the highest in the world. Of 
course, at that time, state and army elites did not perceive such a situation 
as advantageous for Germany – but in the long run, it was so.
Of the 4,000 officers selected for the Reichsheer – most of them were 
the intellectual elite of Kaiser Army, i.e. officers of the General Staff with the 
addition of some highly decorated heroes like Erwin Rommel. This was a 
good blend especially given that these officers had to be extremely efficient 
due to organizational restrictions resulting from the Versailles Treaty.9
Leadership and Combat with Combined Arms was based on the belief 
that fighting a war is an art founded on a rational foundation, but defi-
nitely not a science.10 First of all, starting from the title, the pressure was 
behind co-operation of all arms on the battlefield. There were principles 
of war present in the regulation but no ready-to-apply formulas built into 
the text. The doctrine was founded on decentralized leadership (Auftrags-
taktik), which meant that all command levels had to display initiative and 
creative thinking. If there was one theme in Leadership…, it was the idea 
of manoeuvre warfare (Bewegungskrieg), which was deemed as the core 
of successful combat. It is interesting that in spite of WWI experience, 
firepower was treated seriously as an enabler of movement but not as the 
central pillar of doctrine. The real difference was that the German Army 
9 Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power. German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939–1945 (Lon-
don: Arms and Armour, 1983), 49–53.
10 This notion was repeated in Truppenführung in 1933 which stated in its first paragraph: 
“The conduct of war is an art, depending upon free, creative activity, scientifically grounded.” 
US Army translation of Truppenführung (1936): Truppenführung = Troop leading, National 
government publication (Fort Leawenworth, Kan.: Command and General Staff School Press, 
1936–).
119Building Military Doctrine based on History and Experience
understood and accepted the chaotic character of combat, which made 
the ambition of management-from-the rear futile.
What is obvious is that the army winning the war is not prone to 
revolutionize its way of doing things – it seems that only adjustments here 
and there are needed. This is the case for the Western Allies after WWI. 
Positional warfare and deliberate battle management – this was synony-
mous with a victory for French and British, but for Germans for the 
defeat. Doing the same thing once again and expecting different results 
would be unwise, so Reichsheer leaders decided that they had to avoid 
Stellungskrieg at all cost. Based on their historical background and expe-
rience gained during the last war, von Seeckt and his successor thought 
of positional warfare as an anomaly, not a rule. War of movement on an 
operational level (Bewegungskrieg) lay deep in the institutional history of 
the German army. It can be traced to the Great Elector in the mid-17th 
century through Frederic the Great, the Napoleonic Wars, and the wars of 
German unification up to WWI. One must remember that Kaiser’s Army 
was exposed to many theatres of war and combatants – Russians on the 
Eastern Front, Serbia and Romania in the Balkans, Italians on the Isonzo 
or in Africa. That experience, as well as their own military history, gave 
them a safe distance to evaluate slaughter on the Western Front with a 
different perspective. 
In the early 1930s, due to rapid technological advancements as well as 
a changing political situation in Europe, the German military establish-
ment decided to reformulate their doctrine. They decided that lessons 
learned from WWI had been absorbed by the Reichsheer and that new, 
broader doctrine was needed. A new field regulation – Truppenführung – 
was introduced in 1933 used until the end of WWII, not giving guidelines 
for action and co-operation but rather constituting a philosophy for com-
bat leadership. Although in 1933, the German army still did not possess 
tanks and aircraft, in a few years it was able to introduce and organize 
them in a very efficient way. At that time, the Reichsheer was an organi-
zation with huge potential and the entirety of the foundation it needed. 
The introduction of conscription in 1935, as well as the creation of pan-
zer divisions and the Luftwaffe, was a milestone toward which military-
political establishment had been struggling for years. After the Nazi Party 
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took over Germany, a very important dimension was added – ideology, or 
as Michael Howard put it: “The kind of war which Fascism glorified was 
not that fought by masses of hapless conscripts at the behest of generals 
far behind the lines. It was one which would be conducted by small teams 
of young heroes, airmen, tank-crews, stormtroops, ‘supermen’ who by 
daring and violence would wrest the destiny of mankind from the frock-
coated old dodderers round their green baize tables and shape a cleaner, 
more glorious future. War would, they hoped, in future be a business for 
elites. They were not altogether wrong.”11
The German command philosophy created after the defeat in WWI 
inspired by the stormtroop tactics is of extraordinary importance for 
military history. It has left its mark on all armies up to the present day. In 
1967, militaries across the world were shocked by the Israeli Blitzkrieg, 
and in 1991 they were talking about the American version of it. The assid-
uousness with which Reichsheer commander Gen. Seeckt sought to read 
the lessons of WWI was extraordinary. A great deal of time and energy 
has been devoted to this. The most important thing, however, was that the 
Great War of 1914–1918 was first viewed from the perspective of history, 
and secondly, it was not limited only to the experiences from the Western 
front. Revolutionary changes in doctrine during WWI itself (i.e. elastic 
defence and stormtroop tactics12) had given German army full ability to 
build sound military doctrine.
The geographical characteristic of its central position in Europe led 
Germany to seek operationally based manoeuvre warfare targeted for 
quick and decisive victories. A long war of attrition was a death sentence, 
as was clearly shown during the Great War. The four pillars of German 
military doctrine were:
1. Bewegungskrieg – manoeuvre warfare on an operational level,
2. Auftragstaktik – an initiative based on mission tactics,
11 Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 119–
120.
12 For the process of creation and introduction of new doctrine in German army during WWI 
see: Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine. The changes in German tactical doctrine dur-
ing First World War (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and 
General Staff College, 1981).
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3. Cannae – as an idea of envelopment and decisive victory,
4. Combined arms – integration of arms on tactical and services on 
an operational level.
This doctrine was implemented by constant training on all levels 
of the hierarchy. The tools were: publications of the commander of the 
army,13 military schools of all levels including Kriegsakademie, field exer-
cises, war games, and military press. It led to a clear emphasis on cadre 
quality rather than number. Due to the fact that there was almost no mili-
tary procurement for more than ten years, Reichsheer commanders could 
focus on cadre selection and training – which they did and treated very 
seriously.14 Field exercises were amongst most important from the doctri-
nal point of view. They were not only a test for the soldiers and command-
ers but also a great tool for experimenting with new ideas or technology. 
In 1932 the Reichsheer took to the field almost 2,500 troops with 80 radio 
sets in what was called Funkübung – Communication Exercise, during 
which the idea of wireless communication was tested.15 Then, in 1937, the 
biggest summer field exercise since the Kaiser era took place.16 This time 
the concept of the panzer division was tested and it proved such a success 
that the shocked Commander in Chief decided to overrule the decision 
of umpires. Victory went to the side defending against the panzer divi-
sion. What is interesting is that a scenario for the exercise was planned for 
seven days but the attack of mechanized troops annihilated the opposi-
tion on day three.17Additionally, the discussion in the military press was 
lively and stimulating. It was not strictly controlled by higher authorities, 
and different points of view were presented. 
13 E.g. Seekct’s Bemerkungen des Chefs der Heeresleitung.
14 In the early 1920s, the young company commander Capt. Erich von Manstein was spending 
four days a week outdoors, practicing with soldiers in the field. He also wanted all of his sol-
diers to be trained as leaders able to command at least a level above their current position. Erich 
von Manstein, Aus einem Soldatenleben 1887–1939 (here, the Polish translation has been used: 
Erich von Manstein, Żołnierskie życie. Moja służba w Reichswerze i Wermachcie 1919–1939 
[Kraków: Wingert, 2013], 107–112).
15 Robert Citino, The Path to Blitzkrieg. Doctrine and training in the German army 1920–1939 
(Mechanicsburg: Stackpole, 2008), 234.
16 160 thousand troops, 21 thousand vehicles, 830 tanks and 54 aircraft. Citino, The Path, 236.
17 Robert Citino, Quest for Decisive Victory. From stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, 1899–1940 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 207–208.
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The field in which the German army had critical deficiencies was 
strategy. The Kriegsakademie curriculum focused entirely on tactical-
operational effectiveness up to the level of corps. The fundamentals of 
warfare were also strengthened by military history, which was treated as 
an important introduction to the art of command but also mostly on a 
tactical level; rarely did it touch on operational art.
Table 1.The curriculum of Kriegsakademie (hours in a week) 1934–1938 
Course Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Tactics 6 6 6 + 1 additional whole day
Military History 4 4 4
Logistics – 1 1
Engineering 1 1 –
Panzer forces 1 1 –
Luftwaffe 1 1 1
Source: Manfred Messerschmidt, “German Military Effectiveness between 1919 and 1939” – Allan R. Millet, 
Williamson Murray (Ed.), Military Effectiveness, vol. 2, The Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 244.
The American military attaché to Germany, Col. Conger, summed this 
up with unusual foresight: “I infer that in the next war the Germans will 
be tactically and technically a most formidable fighting force, but that the 
leaders of the army, as so far as they are trained in these schools, will suf-
fer from the same defects which nullified to so great an extent the efforts 
of the German commanders in the field in the world war in that will again 
lack a correct understanding of the lessons taught by military history and 
also lack in understanding of the broader principles of modern strategy, 
including its political and economic, as well as its military, aspects, unless 
some self-made leader comes to the fore who… gains for himself in some 
way a correct understanding of war in its broader phases.”18
18 Citino, The Path, 100–101.
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Fire kills19– French military doctrine  
in the interwar period
During the almost twenty-two years separating the end of WWI and the 
French defeat in 1940, the French army was planning for a war with Ger-
many. First, this task was easy due to Versailles Treaty limitations on the 
size of the Reichsheer, but with time, especially after Adolf Hitler came to 
power, it became much more complex. 
In the interwar period, French doctrine was stable. Government offi-
cials, military establishment as well as society believed it was right. Trau-
matized by WWI and the price in lives that was paid, the military wanted 
to be prepared for almost the same kind of conflict as in the past, but 
without errors committed during 1914–1918. Everyone believed that the 
next war would be long and total so the full commitment of society was 
needed. That is why the French government planned for total mobiliza-
tion of industrial assets and introduced conscription for all able men dur-
ing peacetime. This was the idea of “Nation at Arms” because: “the very 
life of citizenry is associated in an intimate fashion with that of the army, 
and thus the formula for the nation in arms is realized in every aspect… 
[This] greatly influences the eventualities of war and consequently the 
formulation of strategy.”20
Based on WWI experience, it was believed that long military service 
was not really needed in order to have well-trained soldiers. During the 
war, a newly conscripted soldier of 1918 received only three months of 
training and in general was competent in his duties. That is why short-
ening of compulsory service to 18 months and then to one year was not 
seen as anything risky. What had worked during WWI did not work in 
peacetime and French army became a mass of poorly trained reservist 
citizen-soldiers. Only after the introduction of two years of compulsory 
service in 1936 did training standards improve. The French military was 
19 Le feu tue – this is what Gen. Philippe Pétain was preaching.
20 French provisional regulation of 1921 for tactical employment of grand units, see Robert A. 
Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster. The development of French army doctrine, 1919–1939 (Hamden: 
Archon Books, 1985), 16.
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not blind to those problems and knew that they would need time for thor-
ough retraining of soldiers before real military operations could start. So, 
there was a need to buy time in case of war. Hence the idea of building the 
Great Wall called the Maginot Line.
An insufficiently trained army was not the only or even the main 
reason for building fortifications on the French-German border. A well 
thought out set of strategic assumptions was behind it. France would be 
shielded from a surprise attack; concrete fortifications would save the life 
of soldiers, and there would be an economy of force principle applied. 
After WWI, the alliance with Great Britain became much looser. France’s 
aggressive military doctrine would increase the estrangement. Thus, 
building fortifications and defensive military doctrine made real sense. 
The Maginot Line was built on the French-German border and it was 
not built further to the West,21 Last but not least, French army would 
have time to mobilize and their best units could enter Belgium and fight 
 Germans there rather than in France.
French military doctrine in the interwar period was moulded by the 
following assumptions:
1. Because the army was based on short-term conscription, there is 
a need to conduct battles and operations in a centralized, simple 
and planned manner. Additionally, the army needs time to retrain 
its reserves, so that they become fully operational.
2. On the battlefield, firepower rules over the movement. 
3. Defence is easier than offense but, in the end, only offensive action 
can end the war with a victory.22
4. Avoidance of chaotic meeting engagements. 
5. Need to motorize army, though with certain limitations due to 
lack of oil sources in France itself.
21 The fortifications were not built there, apart from strategic considerations, due to: flat and 
muddy terrain, urbanization, population density and industrial centres (e.g. Lille) being too 
close to the border, see Judith H. Hughes, To the Maginot Line: The politics of French military 
preparations in the 1920s (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 202.
22 Mythical conviction that French army was not at all willing to attack, believing only in 
defence, cannot stand the detailed examination, R.A. Doughty, The Seeds, 96.
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6. Tactical usage of tanks is of great importance to the success in 
battle.
7. Low interest in the air force co-operation in the land battle.
8. Latest war experiences (Spanish Civil War) indicated that mecha-
nized forces are very vulnerable to well-applied anti-tank gun-
nery and air force attacks.23
The French army wanted to defend their country at the start of hos-
tilities; then, after total mobilization of the nation and its resources, the 
offensive would follow. The field regulation of 1936 clearly stated that 
such an offensive must be prepared exceptionally well when it comes to 
war material. Such an offensive would be based on artillery fire combined 
with a tank-infantry attack with limited goals. Such methodical battle was 
a reasonable compromise between the strength of defensive fire, mainly 
23 R. Citino, Quest, 245–250.
Somua S-35 tanks displayed during a military parade in the 1930s. Those very 
good tanks failed to make a difference in 1940 due to the poor doctrine of the 
French army. Copyright: Narodowe Archiwum Cyfrowe (public domain)
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artillery, and the necessity of an offensive in the strategic dimension, 
which France had to take sooner or later. Its assumptions, i.e. very accu-
rate planning, extensive communication and control system, were neces-
sary instruments in an army of poorly trained reservists. The methodi-
cal battle concept ensured the confidence of the commanding staff of the 
French army that it would not fail in the future war, because the lessons 
from the previous one were learned. 
Although the French army believed in technological progress, it was 
not very active in searching for new ideas. The air force was used to great 
effect in colonial warfare24 but still, the most influential commanders of 
the army did not think of aircraft as a game changer. In the field regula-
tion of 1936, only four pages out of 177 were devoted to the cooperation 
of land and air forces. The most interesting part is that the French Air 
Force ended the campaign in 1940 with more aircraft than on May 10 – 
at the time of the German attack. Technically, after the loss of about 500 
aircraft – they could conduct further operations basically without a prob-
lem, having enough staff and material resources.25 The same attitude can 
be seen toward tanks and independent tank units. While on the tactical 
level, armour was seen as a valuable tool, and motorization and mecha-
nization of the army were thought beneficial, there was no effort to check 
for the utility of tank arm on the operational level in the future war. At 
the beginning of 1939, the French chief of staff stated: “Just because the 
Germans have committed an enormous error does not mean we must do 
likewise. Understand that there will never be a battlefield large enough for 
several armoured divisions. They can handle local operations, like reduc-
ing a pocket, but not an offensive action.”26
French military doctrine was shaped by military history, but the 
French army never decided to study the Great War in depth. There was 
a multi-volume history of that conflict published – but a final synthesis 
24 Anthony C. Cain, The Forgotten Air Force. French air doctrine in the 1930s (Washington 
D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 2002), 22.
25 Faris R. Kirkland, “The French Air Force in 1940. Was it defeated by the Luftwaffe or by 
politics?”, Air University Review (September-October 1985): 101–118.
26 Eugenia C. Kiesling, Arming against Hitler: France and the limits of military planning (Law-
rence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 162.
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never followed. While preaching that the source of military doctrine is 
military history and principles of wars, the French army in reality studied 
only WWI tactics and operations. French doctrine not only universalized 
lessons it gathered from one quite short war but also totally shut down 
any possibility to discuss the founding assumptions. The military press 
was under the strict control of the Chief of Staff and any deviation from 
orthodoxy was punished.27
The main French military innovation during the interwar period – 
i.e. the Maginot Line – shielded France, and military commanders were 
sure that they would have enough time to prepare for operations once 
the war started. Time was needed for two reasons, to retrain reservists 
and for mobilization of the nation and industry resources. Powerful allies 
were also within reach. The French military-political establishment did 
not see any need for changes in military doctrine.
The Battle of Sedan on 15 May 1940 –  
application of German and French doctrinal models
On 10 May 1940, armies with quite equal potential and equipment faced 
each other. If the Allies were able to achieve stabilization of the front, 
then that balance of forces would make Germany’s strategic perspectives 
look bleak. There was a Soviet enigma in the east and the US, although 
not in alliance with France and Great Britain, had already started sup-
plying them. If we consider that the Allies knew where the battle would 
take place, the Wehrmacht’s prospects of winning seemed even fainter. 
However, the German command had a few advantages, which it used 
to the utmost effect. First, it held some element of surprise, because it 
could decide when the battle would start. Secondly, it had at its disposal 
a proven instrument of waging war in the form of armoured divisions 
and the Luftwaffe, with organizational parameters significantly exceeding 
similar Allied forces. 
27 Kiesling, Arming against Hitler, 122–123.
128 Łukasz Przybyło
There are three main factors concerning the breakthrough at Sedan 
which decided the war in the West. First, in May 1940, the Allies blun-
dered with their strategic deployment. Based on intercepted plans of the 
German invasion in the so-called “Mechelen Incident”28 they decided to 
move their strategic reserve, which had been deployed in the area right 
behind Sedan, to their far-left wing with the mission of going as far as 
Breda and supporting the Dutch defence in case war started. Removal of 
the strategic reserve from the area behind Sedan created an operational 
void, which was the cause of German success after the breakthrough at 
Sedan, making their push to the Channel uninterrupted and relatively 
easy.29 Second, the river crossing battle which decided the war, taking 
place on 15 May in the area of Sedan, was an infantry battle with the 
limited use of tanks on both sides. On that day superior tactical abili-
ties, higher morale and the nearly suicidal combativeness of German 
infantry and engineers with extraordinary leadership and initiative on 
very low command level (sergeants and lieutenants) won the day for the 
Wehrmacht.30 French troops in the Sedan area were of second reserve 
category (B class division), soldiers were old and insufficiently trained. 
55th Infantry Division responsible for Sedan area was deployed in such 
a way which made efficient command impossible – battalions and even 
companies from different regiments were mixed among each other. If that 
was not enough, French soldiers were severely affected by constant Luft-
waffe bombing that started in the morning and lasted for several hours.31 
Third, after the breakthrough in Sedan area, after German panzer divi-
sions entered operational space, their attack tempo was such that the 
28 On 10 January 1940, a German aircraft with an officer on board carrying the plans for Fall 
Gelb crash-landed in neutral Belgium near Mechelen. Belgians notified Allies of their discov-
ery. Captured German documents were describing an operation, in which the main effort was 
behind an offensive through Belgium.
29 Robert A. Doughty, The Breaking Point. Sedan and the fall of France, 1940 (Mechanicsburg: 
Stackpole Books, 2014), 107–108. 
30 Karl-Heinz Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend. The 1940 campaign in the West (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 2005), 161–172.
31 French troops, when confronted by Germans in predictable environment, were fighting 
effectively during the campaign, see Jeffery A. Gunsburg, “Battle of Gembloux 14–15 May 
1940. Blitzkrieg checked,” Journal of Military History (January 2000): 97–140.
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French (and British) OODA32 loop was torn. Allied troops with opera-
tional tempo based on methodical battle procedures were simply not able 
to react quickly enough to changes on the battlefield. 
This mix of causes that decided the Wehrmacht’s success only par-
tially depended on the German doctrine. In fact, both sides gambled. 
The Germans with their front-loaded offensive and lack of considerable 
reserves wanted to achieve victory quickly. The crossing at Sedan was a 
very narrowly run affair with large amounts of chance and luck. On the 
other hand, if only the French could stop the Germans and start the well-
known game of attrition, then their preparation for a long war and full 
mobilization would pay off. In the end, the Wehrmacht won, and a new 
era of mechanized military operations begun. The German army har-
nessed armour, firepower, radio, and the internal combustion engine to 
a conception of war grounded firmly in historical experience.33
Tankomania – the Israeli doctrinal model  
in 1967–1973
The foundations of Israeli strategy are still the same as they were in the 
late 1940s. Israel has to wage short wars as it lacks resources to fight a 
protracted conflict. The lack of territorial depth makes the IDF fight 
offensively – if possible, pre-empting the enemy. Due to a geographical 
characteristic of the Middle East, with its open terrain, air supremacy was 
extremely important for achieving victory. With demographic imbalance 
in the region, Israel numerical inferiority is guaranteed. That is why the 
quality rather than the quantity of soldiers and officers matters for the 
IDF. Israel cannot lose any war because Israelis are sure that this would 
mean a second Holocaust for them, so when it comes to state survival 
they are ready to do anything to save it. From a psychological point of 
32 OODA stands for Observe–Orient–Decide–Act loop, see John R. Boyd, “Patterns of Con-
flict” (1986), http://www.d-n-i.net/boyd/patterns_ppt.pdf [accessed 15.02.2018]. 
33 Williamson Murray, “May 1940: Contingency and fragility of the German RMA,” –The 
Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050, ed. MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray 
(Kindle Edition), loc. 2141.
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view, such attitude results in a very high morale and spirit of self-sacrifice 
in the military: “The prospect of the hangman’s noose makes for wonder-
ful concentration of the mind.”34
At its birth, the IDF lacked any coherent military doctrine and the 
highest level of training provided for officers were platoon and company 
courses. Some officers with a professional background came from the 
British, Soviet, Polish, US and even Austrian armies.35 After the War of 
Independence (1947–1949) ended, the newly created army focused on 
managing the huge wave of immigrants, which hampered organizational 
and educational development.36 Only during Yitzhak Rabin’s tenure as 
head of the Training Department in 1954–1956 did a full structure for 
military education crystallize.37 In the 1950s and early 1960s, the intel-
lectual life of the IDF was quite lively with focus on military doctrine, and 
history.38 Many officers attended foreign general staff academies. 
Israeli commanders decided to use a quality multiplier: the intellec-
tual, cultural and educational superiority of Israel’s manpower over Arabs. 
General Laskov (Chief of Staff 1951–53) decided to introduce what he 
called “optional control”. It was not new, as the term is easily translated 
as the German Auftragstaktik. Tactical commanders (battalion, brigade) 
were fully entitled to make a tactical decision based on their knowledge of 
the end goal of the battle/campaign. Senior commanders (division, area 
command or GHQ) were of course there to control and guide or inter-
vene in case of failure or changes in goals.39
After the Sinai Campaign (1956), the IDF’s view on modern combat 
changed dramatically and transformed from air defence and infantry-
based operations to air superiority, mechanized tank operations, and 
34 Martin van Creveld, Sword and Olive: A critical history of the Israeli Defence Force (New 
York: PublicAffairs, 2008), 167.
35 Avi Kober, Practical Soldiers. Israel’s Military Thought and Its Formative Factors (Leiden: 
Brill, 2016), 129.
36 Ze’ev Drory, Israel’s Reprisal Policy 1953–1956. The dynamics of military retaliation (London: 
Frank Cass, 2005).
37 Creveld, Sword, 167.
38 Measured by percentages of articles in Maarachot, the main IDF’s military journal, 43,5% of 
all articles were devoted to military history, Avi Kober, Practical, 59.
39 Edward Luttwak, Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army (London: A. Lane, 1975), 172–173.
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cooperation between the air force and tank units. Tank and supersonic 
fighter-bombers were seen as the main combat tools. This tendency 
was strengthened when Gen. Israel Tal was promoted to commander of 
armoured forces in 1964. Contrary to the well-established view on com-
bined arms mechanized operations which were to include tanks, infantry, 
artillery, engineers etc. he insisted that due to Israel’s opponents and main 
theatre of operation (Sinai Peninsula), such cooperation was not needed 
to achieve success in battle. While in Europe with its urbanized, rolling 
or hilly terrain with woods and rivers, tactical visibility was low and that 
is why support of other arms was needed. In the featureless, open desert 
of the Sinai, such support in breakthrough battle or meeting engagement 
is not a priority, and if one adds air force operating as flying artillery, it is 
even less needed. General Tal also opted for heavy, well-armoured tanks 
(such as British Centurion), believing that it was not mere speed that 
counted, but battlefield manoeuvrability under fire. During his tenure as 
Israeli paratroopers during manoeuvres using WWII-vintage M3 half-tracks. 
Due to IDF’s “tankomania” and budget restraints infantry was unable to 
support modern tanks on the battlefield. Courtesy: Israeli Government Press 
Office, Moshe Milner
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a commander of armoured forces, he insisted on excellent gunnery, tacti-
cal training, and initiative of leaders on all levels. Due to a high number 
of accidents, damaged equipment and maintenance problems, he intro-
duced strict discipline and adherence to technical procedures.
In the Six Day War, Tal’s concept was an enormous success. Tank bat-
talions and brigades operating semi-independently as armoured fists and 
with co-operation with an air force (which replaced artillery) destroyed 
the opposing forces. Excellent gunnery, tactical skills and initiative gave 
Israelis a huge margin in battlefield effectiveness. In armoured operations, 
infantry was almost always delegated to mopping-up operations and 
keeping supply routes open. So not only Tal’s concept was proven right, 
due to the magnitude of the victory, any criticism was easily rejected. 
Israelis, who tend to value more experience over ideas, were converted 
to an all-tank army organization. They had not thought such an over-
whelming victory over the Arabs was possible due to circumstances not 
easily repeatable in the future war. Israeli doctrine not only universalized 
lessons that it gathered from one and short war but also saw no need to 
discuss its founding assumptions. 
The Israeli army was preparing for the next round of hostilities with 
the Arab states, in such a way as to repeat the success of 1967. The cha-
racteristics of the armed forces, which yielded the largest dividend dur-
ing the Six Day War, were emphasized. More than half of the military 
budget was allocated for the expansion and modernization of air force. 
Armoured forces were rapidly expanding but at the cost of the infantry 
and artillery. The IDF took for granted an intelligence advantage over 
the Arabs and surrendered to “tankomania”. Battalions and armoured 
brigades became units almost completely devoid of infantry, engineers, 
and artillery (mortars) and were based only on tanks.40 This was strange, 
as during the Six Day War, infantry and paratroopers showed their util-
ity, either in conducting complex combined-arms breakthroughs (Abu-
Ageila, Golan Heights) or in urban fighting (Jerusalem). Partly this was 
because of military budget limitations but also suitable armoured fight-
40 David Eshel, Chariots of Desert. The story of Israeli Armored Corps (London: Brassey's 1989, 
1989), 88; interview with Brigadier General Zvi Kan-Tor, Latrun 19 September 2017.
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ing vehicles for infantry were not available and artillery tasks were taken 
over by the air force. In such a situation, investment in even more tanks 
seemed most economical. At some point, Gen. Tal even tried to propose 
an all-tank brigade, consisting only of three pure tank battalions as a stan-
dard organizational pattern. This “ideal” was quite common in the Yom 
Kippur War when many Israeli armoured brigades fought with almost 
only tanks in their order of battle.41
Israelis did not pay attention to conducting a war at the operational 
level and underestimated the importance of this skill. There was an anti-
intellectual attitude in the officer corps.42 General Tal once stated that 
Israeli officers were promoted by a natural selection process based on 
their battlefield achievements. The highest compulsory course for offi-
cers – the course for battalion commanders. Command and Staff Acad-
emy, which was supposed to educate officers from the rank of first lieu-
tenant to lieutenant colonel – was held in low esteem.43Additionally, just 
before the Six Day War, the General Staff Academy, which was meant for 
colonels and generals as well as civilians dealing with military and secu-
rity problems, was abolished by Prime Minister and Minister of Defense 
Levi Eshkol, who deemed it unnecessary.44 General David “Dado” Elazar 
was promoted and eventually took over the position of the head of the 
General Staff without any additional education apart from the battalion 
commanders’ course.45
Such attitude narrowed the intellectual horizon of the IDF. It almost 
stopped studying the theory of war or military history to such degree 
that Martin van Creveld after lecturing general staff members stated: “I 
have never met such a bunch of ignorant people in my entire life. In no 
other state or organization have I seen people who knew so little about 
their profession and its theory, including the history and doctrine of their 
41 Interviews with General Major Haim Erez, Latrun 8 March 2018; General Major Jackie 
Even, Latrun 8 March 2018; Brigadier General Zvi Kan-Tor, Latrun 19 September 2017 and 
Brigadier General Avigdor Kahalani, Tel Aviv 16 September 2016. 
42 Creveld, Sword, 168.
43 Ibid.
44 Interview with Rear Admiral Ze’ev Almog, Tel Aviv/Ramat Ha’Sharon, 16–19.09.2016.
45 Creveld, Sword, 169.
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own army.”46 Lack of education and knowledge made the higher echelons 
of the IDF unimaginative, not ready to change their worldview, rehears-
ing once and again the Six Day War in their “sterile” field exercises,47 not 
able to understand war as an instrument of policy or distinguish between 
 tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. 
Before the Yom Kippur War, Israeli strategy and military doctrine was 
based on a set of assumptions. Almost none of them materialized during 
the war (Table 1).
The Yom Kippur War was Israel’s last high-intensity conflict with 
its Arab neighbours. In the end, the IDF won militarily but not on the 
strategic/political level. The high number of casualties and lost equip-
46 Kober, Practical, 44.
47 Amiram Ezov, Crossing Suez, 1973: New point of view (Kindle Edition, Tel Aviv, 2016), loc. 
974–977.
Israeli reservists preparing to enter Golan Heights during the Yom Kippur 
War (6th October 1973, evening). Reservists were the cushion that mitigated 
doctrinal and strategic errors of the IDF General Staff. Courtesy: Israeli 
Government Press Office
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Table 1. IDF’s strategic-doctrinal assumption and the reality of the Yom Kippur War. 
Israeli strategic assumption  
before the Yom Kippur War
Yom Kippur War
Intelligence superiority over Arabs. 
At least 48 hours warning, enabling 
mobilization before war erupts. 
No intelligence superiority.
Warning nine hours before the war, 
mobilization starts four hours before the war.
Pre-emptive attack. 
Due to a relationship with the US and 
dependence on their military aid, pre-emptive 
attack not possible.
Israeli Air Force able to win air superiority 
over the battlefield.
Israeli Air Force not able to win air supremacy 
by its own effort over the battlefield due to 
SAMs and various defence measurement taken 
by Arabs (e.g. hardened shelters for aircraft).
No alliance between Arab countries 
probable.
A coalition between Syria and Egypt.
Israeli doctrinal assumption  
before Yom Kippur War
Yom Kippur War
Low morale of Arab armies. High morale and cohesion of Arab armies.
The mediocre ability of Arab armies to 
defend tactically against tanks.
High ability of Arab armies to defend tactically 
against tanks through widespread use of 
portable anti-tank weapons and guided AT 
missiles augmented by tanks and artillery.
The inability of Arab armies to fight offensive 
mobile armoured operations.
The inability of Arab armies to fight offensive 
mobile armoured operations. 
Availability of IAF to support ground troops.
The inability of IAF to support ground troops 
in the first phase of the war. Only after ground 
and/or air force destroyed enemy SAMs, 
support was given for ground operations.
The purely offensive character of operations. 
After a short period of defence, reserve 
divisions quickly counterattack the enemy.*
Protracted defensive operations, failure of 
reserves to successfully counterattack (Sinai). 
Even successful counteroffensive in Golan 
started after two days of defence.
Israeli armour has ability to survive on the 
battlefield without or with limited support 
from other arms (infantry, artillery, engineers 
etc.) in both defensive and offensive 
operations.
No or limited possibility to conduct offensive 
operations by armour alone. Medium to high 
ability to defend without supporting arms.
Utmost importance of tactical skills and 
mastery of gunnery. 
Utmost importance of tactical skills and 
mastery of gunnery.
Tank divisions under Front (Area Command) 
command able to conduct operations.
Lack of intermediate level of command (corps 
HQ) disrupting operations.
* For the seven plans for the defence of Sinai created at the Southern Command in 1967–1973 as many as six 
ended with the crossing of the Canal by IDF and whatever the force structure (2 brigades or 2 divisions) only 
offensive on Syria was considered, Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in War. With fear of change (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 272–273.
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ment outstripped any Israeli expectation. Radical criticism of the the 
IDF’s performance and commanders erupted in society. Egypt’s war aims 
were accomplished: the Sinai Peninsula was returned by Israel; the Soviet 
patron was changed to the American one. Those accomplishments came 
at a price for Egypt as it had to recognize Israel. In Syria’s case, noth-
ing substantial was achieved by both sides; the northern border of Israel 
stayed a “hot” one.
But why did the IDF win militarily at all, given that almost all of its 
assumptions concerning future war were invalid? Almost all the answers 
consider the tactical level:
1. Israel’s regular and reserve soldiers were experienced war veter-
ans commanded by very able officers at platoon/company/battal-
ion/brigade level.
2. Their tactical training was exceptional, including excellent gun-
nery among tank crews.
3. Spirit of adaptation, innovation, and improvisation based on the 
individual initiative were common across all army.
4. Among all troops, morale, will to fight and unit cohesion was 
high – this was manifested in many heroic actions and even acts 
of self-sacrifice.
5. Alliance with the US and their support both in supplying resources 
as well as in global politics. 
Although classroom study of war is still not rated higher than practi-
cal experience in waging war, after the Yom Kippur War the IDF changed 
not only its force structure48 but also educational policy. For the first time 
in the IDF’s history, integrated officers’ courses of different arms made 
an appearance.49 The Command and Staff Academy was reformed. The 
National Defense College for study Israel’s strategic and security environ-
ment was re-established. When the IDF invaded Lebanon in 1982 then 
CIC Israeli Navy, rear admiral Ze’ev Almog could: “just take my notes 
from Naval War College in the US. We studied different operational and 
48 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Arab–Israeli Military Balance and the Art of Operations (Lon-
don: American Enterprise Institute, 1987), 45–53.
49 Interview with Brigadier General Zvi Kan-Tor, Latrun 19 September 2017.
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strategic case studies. I took one on the Inchon amphibious invasion in 
the Korean War. That was enough to start planning seaborne landing in 
Lebanon.”50
Air-Land Battle – American military doctrine  
building 1973–1991
The long conflict in Vietnam ending in defeat had a disastrous impact 
on the American army.51 In addition to the problems with discipline and 
morale, there were signs that the American army might lose a conven-
tional conflict in Europe. Such predictions were strengthened by the Yom 
Kippur War. The modern Soviet-made equipment used by Arabs proved 
to have very good technical characteristics and American equipment 
did not have a technological advantage which would suffice to fight the 
numerically much bigger Soviet forces.52
The American political-military establishment had to quickly “fix” the 
armed forces. First, the conscription was suspended. Secondly, the struc-
ture of the armed forces changed – among others Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC) was created.53 Thirdly, it was decided to purchase 
new equipment. The most important change, however, was the change of 
doctrine. This was accomplished by General William E. DePuy, head of 
TRADOC, who in July 1976 introduced a new field regulation (FM 100-5 
Operations).
The commander of TRADOC focused on a few issues, making a strict 
selection of priorities. DePuy was convinced that European Theatre of 
50 Interview with Rear Admiral Ze’ev Almog, Tel Aviv/Ramat Ha’Sharon 16–19 September 2016.
51 Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War (Fort Leavenworth: Combat 
Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1993), 6.
52 “Implication of the Middle East war on US Army tactics, doctrine and systems”, – Selected 
Papers of General William E. DePuy, ed. Robert M. Swain (Leavenworth: Combat Studies Insti-
tute, US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994), 75–112.
53 The Training and Doctrine Command consolidated three logically connected functions 
under one command: 1) research on new fighting techniques combined with the evaluation of 
new technical solutions, 2) development of the doctrine and organization of the land army, 3) 
training of officers and non-commissioned officers.
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Operations is the most important for the American army and because of 
increased tempo of operations and the lethality of modern weapons, the 
US Army must win the “first battle” through “active defence”. Acquisi-
tion of new weapons had to comply with doctrinal assumptions. If the 
new doctrine was to be successful it had to be coordinated with activities 
and in doctrinal agreement with the most important ally in NATO (Ger-
many) and American air forces. Based on the recent experience from the 
Yom Kippur War tank was considered the main weapon system in land 
forces and the military doctrine was developed based on that assumption.
The first stage to change the military doctrine of the United States 
Army was to write new combat regulations and introduction of the 
Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) consisting of a list of 
tasks that any given unit (from the squad to the battalion) had to per-
form according to the appropriate standard.54 This standard was based on 
Israeli experience of the Yom Kippur War backed up by the assumptions 
on how Soviet Army conducts war.
General DePuy entrusted writing of a new version of FM 100-5 Oper-
ations to General John Cushman – Chief of Combined Arms Centre at 
Fort Leavenworth. The first draft of the new regulations was rejected by 
General DePuy in December 1974, the second draft met the same fate in 
May 1975. General Cushman was considered a military intellectual and 
his draft of the new regulations of the FM 100-5 was based on the nine 
principles of war used by the US Army from 1922. He believed that the 
doctrine should not be authoritative but should help the commander in 
making the best decisions. Cushman wanted to teach officers to conduct 
a war based on their initiative and knowledge of what usually worked best 
over the centuries on the battlefield. In his own words: “[doctrine is] the 
best available thought that can be defended by reason ... [to] indicate and 
guide but ... not bind in practice....”55
It was a concept totally contrary to what Gen. DePuy expected. The 
TRADOC commander wanted to quickly train US Army officers to con-
54 Paul H. Herbert, Deciding what has to be done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edi-
tion of FM 100-5 Operations (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command 
and General Staff College Press, 1988), 48.
55 Herbert, Deciding, 55–56.
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duct mechanized operations on the lethal battlefield using the FM 100-5 
regulations. The key to successful training had to be the authoritative war 
doctrine expressed, among others, by FM 100-5, written in a clear, simple 
and detailed manner. Gen. DePuy did not think that General Cushman’s 
approach was wrong – only inappropriate at the time. There was no time 
to slowly teach the principles of war – it was necessary to train officers 
for a war that could start at any moment. DePuy with a small group of 
officers wrote the FM 100-5 regulation. 
The critique of FM 100-5 started immediately after the document was 
published on 1st July 1976. It focused on three main areas:
1. Predominance of defensive operations.
2. Mechanistic vision of the battlefield.
3. Europe as one and only theatre of operations.56
American officers perceived FM 100-5 as “how to physically destroy 
enemy forces” with the employment of mobility and attrition, not “how the 
American army should fight in order to win”. Quantitative and systemic 
analysis, which was the foundation of the FM 100-5, perfectly matched 
the computer models – it did not consider factors other than material, 
and these were the ones that most often decided victory in battle. Tactics 
were limited to the following process: recognize the enemy’s main effort – 
withdraw, delay the attack – mass the reserves (achieve a favourable ratio 
of forces) – destroy the enemy with fire.57 The features of the doctrinal 
document – to facilitate understanding and then its acceptance – turned 
against it. American officers read and understood the doctrine of “active 
defence” and then rejected it.
At the end of 1978, when the weaknesses of the FM 100-5 edi-
tion of 1976 had been identified, new TRADOC commander General 
Don Starry established the basic assumptions of the new doctrine in a 
 planning document. Starry was a tank officer inspired by a Patton-like 
view of battle where DePuy was a classical, scientific battle manager. To 
increase the understanding of the new doctrine, General Starry called 
it Air-Land Battle, as it assumed a very strong interaction between 
56 Ibid., 96.
57 Huba Wass de Czege, L.D. Holder, “The new FM 100-5,” Military Review (July 1982): 53–54.
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land and air forces. This term was also intuitively understood by 
officers. 
FM 100-5 Operations (1982), was based on two foundations: history 
and principles of war. The text of the regulation included two historical 
examples, the Vicksburg campaign (American Civil War) and the Battle 
of Tannenberg (WWI). The first illustrated the value of indirect strat-
egy, the second was about the quick transition from defence to offensive 
operations. Abundant war quotes (from Sun Zi, through Napoleon and 
Clausewitz to Patton) were also presented, and the concept of Air-Land 
Battle was placed in the context of principles of war used by the United 
States Army. Such an accepted framing of the new doctrine made it uni-
versal, it could be used in any conflict – both in Europe and in other 
parts of the globe. At the same time, the authors did not hide the fact 
that they were preparing the US Army for a conflict with the Warsaw 
Pact forces, for a mechanized battle in which the combined arms (and 
services) played a key role. 
Four years after the introduction of the Air-Land Battle doctrine, 
General William R. Richardson, the successor of General Starry as the 
head of TRADOC and another infantry officer, decided to introduce 
another version of FM-105 (1986). This time it was not a revolutionary 
change, but confirmation of the current doctrinal course and refining the 
concept in line with criticism of Starry’s line.58
The evolution of American military doctrine is one of constant evo-
lution. It is interesting that the shock of defeat in Vietnam and the Yom 
Kippur War happened in the same time, enabling US Army to reengineer 
its doctrine based on a scientific conclusion drawn from the Arab–Israeli 
conflict. First iteration – Active Defence was too mechanistic, focusing 
solely on defensive operations. Second and third iterations – Air-Land 
Battle added more dimensions apart from material only and were more 
balanced. Military history, which was absent in Active Defence manual, 
was integrated directly into text of Air-Land Battle regulations, showing 
that US Army top commanders understood how important it could be 
in educating officers. 
58 William Richardson, “FM 100-5. The AirLand Battle in 1986,” Military Review (March 1997).
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Since the creation of TRADOC, one of the main questions posed by 
the commanders of this institution was how to pass the knowledge from 
the regulations to soldiers and officers – in such a way as to create a uni-
form intellectual discipline in the army. Several institutions were devised 
to do that, and some old ones were “fixed”. At the level of NCOs, the wages 
and living conditions improved, education was radically improved with 
Sergeants Major Academy as the final level of professional education.59 
National Training Centre was erected with its technical gadgets enabling 
testing not only units but commanders at the brigade level. Battle Com-
mand Training Program (BCTP) for corps and army level commanders 
and their staffs were introduced60 and School of Advanced Military Stud-
ies (SAMS) supplied those staffs with officers understanding the opera-
tional level of war and complexities of the modern battlefield.61
TRADOC commander General William R. Richardson defined the 
role of TRADOC in the following terms: “[TRADOC] embraces three 
distinct elements of [officers’] preparation: intellectual, psychological and 
physical. Intellectual preparation begins with the textbook in the class-
room but moves quickly to the map, to the sand table and then to the ter-
rain. Intellectual preparation provides the mental basis for a broad per-
spective on warfare by thoroughly and systematically searching military 
history while simultaneously scanning the future for new technology and 
new concepts.”62
Battle of 73 Easting, 26 February 1991
On 26 February 1991 during Operation Desert Storm, the 2nd Armored 
Cavalry Regiment (ACR) of the US Army was in the vanguard of the 
VII Corps on the axis of the main Allied attack. Its task was to find the 
main Iraqi forces, determine their size and the type of defenses so that the 




62 Richardson, “FM 100-5,” 5.
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heavy divisions following behind could destroy them quickly. During this 
reconnaissance mission, three squadrons of the 2nd ACR came in contact 
with the Iraqi brigade from the Republican Guard division “Tawakalna”.63 
In less than 40 minutes, despite the raging sandstorm, captain H.R. 
McMasters’ squadron consisting of 9 Abrams (M1) and 12 Bradley (M3) 
tanks destroyed 37 T-72 and 32 IFVs. In an hour, after other squadrons 
joined the fight, the Iraqi brigade was destroyed. American losses were 
two Bradleys (including one destroyed by friendly fire) and one killed sol-
dier. It was decided to digitalize the battle of 2nd ACR at 73 Easting. Each 
tank, combat vehicle or truck was virtualized, and all possible sources of 
information were used to feed the model.64
While the outcome of the Gulf War of 1991 was almost predeter-
mined, considering the superiority of resources the Allies had, but the 
level of casualties and swiftness of operations were a surprise. Offi-
cial estimates of allied losses prepared before the campaign were more 
than 200 or 300 times higher than the real figure. A simple explana-
tion of the low allied losses proved difficult due to various factors 
causing the linear combination of causes to have insufficient “power 
of explanation”. Iraqi morale and skills were at least at the level of the 
Arab army in 1967–1973–1982, there was no significant gap in terms 
of training and skills between the US Army and the IDF, but the pro-
portion of American casualties was 10 times lower than Israel’s in 1967. 
Another problem hindering the explanation of low allied losses was the 
fact that technology on the Kuwait Theatre of Operations (KTO) dif-
fered significantly, and the level of losses was equally low everywhere. 
In addition, the battles with the Iraqi army took place without the sig-
nificant numerical advantage of Allied forces, and often took the form 
of a frontal attack. 
63 3rdTawakalna ala-Allah Mechanised Division.
64 Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War tells us about the future of 
conflict,” International Security, 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 139–179. This article is part of Stephen 
Biddle’s, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 2005). More popular version of events at 73 Easting is presented in Tom 
Clancy, Armored Cav: A guided tour of an armoured cavalry regiment (New York: Berkley 
Books, 1994).
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Stephen Biddle decided to conduct a series of scenario analysis based 
on the 73 Easting database. There were several strengths and weaknesses 
defined for both Iraqi and American forces – e.g. thermal sights on 
Abrams tanks, Iraqi tanks not in hull-down position, an air force advan-
tage for the Allies, etc. During the Janus computer simulation, seven 
different scenarios were tested, and both Iraqi and American strengths 
and weaknesses were turned on and off. According to the explanation 
of the low level of American casualties during the Gulf War proposed by 
Stephan Biddle, the war saw synergy between most modern technology 
and the combat skills of US Army troops. It caused a radical reduction 
of the attacker’s losses and exponential growth of losses for the defender, 
whose grasp of technology and knowledge how to apply it efficiently on 
the battlefield was lacking. One could argue that the difference in skills 
and technology created a “technological multiplier” effect.
The Battle of 73 Easting perfectly illustrates the effectiveness of the 
American “Air-Land Battle” doctrine. The victory of the 2nd ACR was 
Abrams tank from 2nd Cavalry, Gulf War 1991. Soldiers of this regiment were 
achieving 85% accuracy during training – 182 hits for 215 fired shots in the 
distance below 2000 m. Courtesy: DoD/Spc. David Faas
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undoubtedly due to technological superiority, but the most important 
was the excellent training and combat skills. According to the scenario 
analysis of the Battle of Easting 73, these two elements are intertwined 
and created an extremely strong non-linear combination.
Conclusions
Military history’s impact on the armed forces cannot be studied on a 
standalone basis. It is one of many “ingredients” of the mix that armies 
use for training, war planning and creation of doctrines. Very rapid tech-
nological advances make some soldiers think that history is becoming 
irrelevant, while at the same time, there are pundits who cry about new 
paradigms like hybrid warfare, the 4th generation of warfare, RMAs etc., 
which for a military historian are nothing new and sometimes seem like a 
pure marketing exercise or historically undisciplined theorizing.65
All four case studies presented in this paper present a different 
approach to military history. German Reichsheer focused on the WWI 
experience at the tactical and operational level. The study of the Great War 
was very detailed, scientific and serious – something that is rarely seen in 
the annals of military history – but without including the political and 
strategic dimensions. Due to change in the military environment caused 
by technology, the Reichsheer framed those experiences in the broader 
paradigm of operational war of movement based on military history. But 
German military focused so much on rapidly winning campaigns against 
neighbours that it did not create any institutions for education of higher 
command echelons of the army in the area of grand strategy. Through 
WWII, the Wehrmacht was an extremely efficient organization on the 
tactical and operational field but seriously lacking in the strategy field. 
Whatever military success the German army achieved, Germany’s unpre-
paredness for waging war on a grand strategic level made its downfall 
certain. 
65 Williamson Murray, Richard H. Sinnreich, ed. The Past as Prologue. The importance of his-
tory to the military profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 6.
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The French army did exactly the opposite. After the carnage of WWI, 
French generals had thought they found the right formula for victory. 
They accepted the constraints of the strategic level of war, assuming that 
the next one would be long and total. Although they were right, it was 
not they who eventually fought it. The French military was also willing to 
harvest the dividend of peace, which was possible because Germany was 
disarmed, which meant a low level of investment in arms and shortened 
service times for conscripted soldiers. That undermined the army’s abil-
ity to fight at the tactical level efficiently. French military doctrine was 
based on fighting techniques developed at the end of WWI, but no thor-
ough examination of battlefield experience took place. Studies of mili-
tary history turned into studies on WWI as no other campaign seemed 
relevant for the top military establishment. The French army decided 
to address its shortcomings by building the Maginot Line. Those forti-
fications were supposed to shield France from a surprise attack, enable 
mobilization of national resources and let the army prepare for an offen-
sive. In the end, the Maginot Line held – but the army lost the crucial 
Battle of Sedan. 
The Israelis are on the other side of the spectrum of how armies treat 
military history. IDF doctrine was almost totally based on battlefield expe-
rience, which doomed it to reinvent the wheel again and again. Optional 
control, i.e. Auftragstaktik or mission command; infantry assault tech-
niques, i.e. stormtroop tactics; reforms of Armoured Corps, i.e. WWII 
experience – all of this was already on the table. When one adds racial 
prejudice toward Arabs and hubris after the Six Day War, it was a poten-
tially disastrous cocktail. What saved Israel during the Yom Kippur War 
were the soldiers, their battlefield experience, high morale, and cohe-
sion as well as the very high level of tactical training. This was the cush-
ion that mitigated all of the IDF’s intellectual, operational and strategic 
errors. 
The US Army’s doctrinal revolution in the 1970s and 1980s is a model 
example of how to employ battlefield experience, technology and military 
history in the creation of military doctrine. It is not an easy process and 
takes a great deal of time. As Brigadier General Barry B. McCaffrey, the 
commander of 24th Infantry Division during Operation Desert Storm, put 
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it: “The Gulf War was not won in 100 hours. It took 15 years.”66 American 
military changed its doctrine three times during the period 1976–1986 
with the pendulum swinging wildly from Active Defence to the concept 
of aggressive Air-Land Battle, finally settling on a more nuanced and bal-
anced 1986 version. Serious research was conducted on Israeli battlefield 
experience in the Yom Kippur War and adjustments were made to train-
ing with a focus on tactical effectiveness and combined arms. New equip-
ment was rapidly pressed into service. The operational level of war was 
introduced with FM 100-5 version of 1982, and a further iteration framed 
it around military history and redefined principles of war. No effort was 
spared to train armed forces in conducting war with the creation of TRA-
DOC, the revival of the NCO Corps, ARTEP, National Training Centre, 
Battle Command Training Program and SAMS studies. While the result 
of the Gulf War was never in question, the speed and low cost of victory 
were a surprise for almost all military analysts. 
Constant historical awareness and education of the officer corps with 
all width, depth, and context67 and on the tactical, operational and stra-
tegic level is a must.68 Armies are able to win wars without a high level of 
expertise in historical matters as the Israeli case study shows, but in the 
process they face much higher costs in lives and equipment. If armies 
decide to study military history only partially, as the French and German 
case study shows, it may radically impact their short- or long-term abil-
ity to win wars. Closest to the realization of the above mentioned aim of 
historical awareness of the officer corps was the US Army in the period 
1982–1991, but it did so with an enormous investment into institutions 
and training.
As General Patton said, “to be a successful soldier you must study his-
tory,” and there is simply no other way. “Study” is a key word as studying 
of military history should primarily lead to knowledge of not only what 
happened but should also focus on why and how it happened. General 
Fuller stated: “The first fact to note is that the study of history possesses 
66 During Congressional hearing after the Gulf War, Scales, Certain, 35.
67 Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” Parameters 21, no. 1 (1981): 13–14.
68 Robert H. Scales, “The Second Learning Revolution,” – Rethinking the Principles of War, ed. 
Antony D. Mc Ivor (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 56–57.
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only one true value, the discovery of what may prove useful in the future. 
The object of the study of history is to prepare us for the next war, con-
sequently, all the ephemeral details (…) should be passed over lightly, 
and attention concentrated on what is of permanent value in war. What 
is required is the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of success and failure in a series of cam-
paigns, and not the microscopic knowledge of any one campaign.”69
The key takeaway from this paper is that military history may be an 
“intellectual multiplier” for militaries. But for it to work, it has to multiply 
tangible and intangible assets – e.g. equipment; tactical proficiency; high 
initiative, morale, cohesion; and mastery of weapons. The more valuable 
the “military portfolio” is, the better leverage for “profit” one can achieve 
using military history. This may be the difference between winning or 
losing the next war. 
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